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ABSTRACT 
Banking sector is one of dominant sector and represents 
growth and development of the economy. The sector has 
been one of the top performers in stock market. Indian 
Stock Market experienced great volatility during the period 
of 2007-2008. The study is about the ownership structure 
and risk in Indian banks which they encountered during the 
period of slow down in India. This paper examines the 
effect of ownership on performance and risk of 
commercial banks in India during the period 2000-2009. 
The study would examine whether there exists any 
significant difference in the performance and risk among 
Public and sector banks and effort has been made to 
evaluate the performance of bank before and after the 
period of 2007-2008 to evaluate and understand the ground 
reality in Indian banking sector. The study investigated 
that whether any significant difference exists in the 
performance and risk of ownership groups of private & 
public banks in India. Regression results would be used to 
examine the association between the size of the banks and 
non-performing loans, and between demand deposits & 
risky loans. 
Keywords Ownership Structure; Bank Risk; 
independent sample T-test; Private Banks and Public 
Banks, demand deposits, NPA. 
Introduction 
The last three decades have been characterized by repeated 
banking crises (the current financial crisis of 2008, the US 
savings and loans debacle of the eighties, the 1994-95 
Mexican crisis, the 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian financial 
crises, etc.). Such episodes emphasize the inherently 
unstable nature of banking and the propensity that banks 
have towards excessive risk-taking. The past decade has 
seen dramatic losses in the banking industry. Firms that 
had been performing well suddenly announced large losses 
due to credit exposures that turned sour, interest rate 
positions taken, or derivative exposures that may or may 
not have been assumed to hedge balance sheet risk. In 
response to this, commercial banks have almost 
universally embarked upon an upgrading of their risk 
management and control systems. 
The banking industry recognizes that an institution need 
not engage in business in a manner that unnecessarily 
imposes risk upon it; nor should it absorb risk that can be 
efficiently transferred to other participants. Rather, it 
should only manage risks at the firm level that are more 
efficiently managed there than by the market itself or by 
their owners in their own portfolios. The banking industry 
has long viewed the problem of risk management as the 
need to control four of the above risks which make up 
most, if not all, of their risk exposure, viz., credit, interest 
rate, foreign exchange and liquidity risk. While they 
recognize counterparty and legal risks, they view them as 
less central to their concerns. Where counterparty risk is 
significant, it is evaluated using standard credit risk 
procedures, and often within the credit department itself. 
Likewise, most bankers would view legal risks as arising 
from their credit decisions or, more likely, proper process 
not employed in financial contracting. 
The issue of ownership structure is of particular interest for 
the banking industry as several factors interact and alter 
governance, such as the quality of bank regulation and 
supervision and the opacity of bank assets. Risk 
management is a cornerstone of cautious banking practice. 
Undoubtedly all banks in the present-day volatile 
environment are facing a large number of risks such as 
credit risk, liquidity risk, foreign exchange risk, market 
risk and interest rate risk, among others – risks which may 
threaten a bank’s survival and success. In other words, 
banking is a business of risk. For this reason, efficient risk 
management is absolutely required. Carey (2001) indicates 
in this regard that risk management is more important in 
the financial sector than in other parts of the economy. The 
purpose of financial institutions is to maximize revenues 
and offer the most value to shareholders by offering a 
variety of financial services, and especially by 
administering risks. Recently many commercial banks 
have appointed senior managers to oversee a formal risk 
management function. 
Review of Literature 
There have been a large number of studies published about 
risk management in general. However, the number of the 
empirical studies on risk management practices in financial 
institutions was found to be relatively small. The following 
is an attempt to summarize the main conclusions of some 
selected studies.  
Empirically, Saunders et al (1990) were the first to test 
the relationship between banks’ ownership structure and 
their risk-taking incentives. They found a positive 
relationship between managerial stock ownership 
(proportion of stock held by managers) and risk taking. 
Moreover, they found that banks controlled by 
shareholders take more risk than banks controlled by 
managers. Saunders et al. (1990), found a significant 
effect of ownership concentration on risk-taking but 
without any consensus on the sign of such a relationship. If 
some studies found a negative relationship, others obtain 
U-shaped relationships (or inverse U-shaped) between 
ownership concentration and risk (Gorton and Rosen, 
1995; Chen, et al., 1998; Anderson and Fraser, 2000). 
U-shaped relationships between ownership and risk taking 
could be explained by managers’ entrenchment. 
However, there is now a growing literature on the reasons 
for active risk management including the work of Stulz 
(1984), Smith, Smithson and Wolford (1990), and 
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Froot, Sharfstein and Stein (1993) to name but a few of 
the more outstanding contributions. In fact, the review of 
risk management reported in Santomero (1995) lists 
dozens of contributions to the area and at least four distinct 
rationales offered for active risk management. These 
include managerial self interest, the non-linearity of the tax 
structure, the costs of financial distress and the existence 
of capital market imperfections. Any one of these justified 
the firms' concern over return variability, as the above-
cited authors demonstrate. 
Vining and Boardman (1992) reviewed 54 studies that 
compared the performance of firms’ between private and 
state ownership and found that 36 studies concluded that 
private firms perform better; six studies revealed that state-
owned banks perform better; and 16 studies did not 
support either form of ownership. 
Laeven (1999) considered different forms of bank 
ownership including state-owned, foreign-owned, 
company-owned and family-owned banks but not banks 
owned by institutional investors. Working on a panel of 
Asian banks before the Asian crisis of 1997, he found that 
family-owned 
banks were among the most risky banks together with 
company-owned banks whereas foreign-owned banks took 
little risk relatively to other banks. 
Salas and Saurina (2002) examined credit risk in Spanish 
commercial and savings banks; they used panel data to 
compare the determinants of problem loans of Spanish 
commercial and savings banks in the period 1985-1997, 
taking into account both macroeconomic and individual 
bank-level variables. The GDP growth rate, firms, family 
indebtedness, rapid past credit or branch expansion, 
inefficiency, portfolio composition, size, net interest 
margin, capital ratio and market power were variables that 
explain credit risk. Their findings raise important bank 
supervisory policy issues: the use of bank-level variables 
as early warning indicators, the advantages of mergers of 
banks from different regions, and the role of banking 
competition and ownership in determining credit risk. 
Linbo Fan (2004) examined efficiency versus risk in large 
domestic USA banks. He found that profit efficiency is 
sensitive to credit risk and insolvency risk but not to 
liquidity risk or to the mix of loan products. Hahm (2004) 
conducted an empirical study on interest rate and exchange 
rate exposures of banking institutions in pre-crisis Korea. 
The results indicated that Korean commercial banks and 
merchant banking corporations had been significantly 
exposed to both interest rate and exchange rate risks, and 
that the subsequent profitability of commercial banks was 
significantly associated with the degree of pre-crisis 
exposure. The results also indicated that the Korean case 
highlights the importance of upgrading financial 
supervision and risk management practices as a 
precondition for successful financial liberalization. It 
seems appropriate for any discussion of risk management 
procedures to begin with why these firms manage risk. 
According to standard economic theory, managers of value 
maximizing firms ought to maximize expected profit 
without regard to the variability around its expected value.  
Iannota et al, (2007) also highlighted that mutual banks 
and government owned banks appear as less profitable 
than private-owned banks. Moreover, they found that 
government-owned banks have poorer loan quality and 
higher default risk, while mutual banks have better loan 
quality and lower asset risk than both private-owned and 
government-owned banks. In addition, some papers have 
shown that foreign owned banks exhibit a higher 
performance than other banks, particularly in developing 
countries (Claessens et al., 2001; Bonin et al, 2005; 
Micco et al., 2007). 
Methodology  
The paper aims to test the risk in the Indian commercial 
banks through comparison of public and private banks 
operating in India. For this study, the data of 41 banks both 
private and public have been taken. The fixed effects 
model and the random effects model have been employed 
to test for any significant difference in Indian banks’ 
performance and risk due to the fact that former technique 
takes into account the firm-specific effect and the latter 
considers the time effect. 
In statistics, a random effect(s) model, also called a 
variance components model is a kind of hierarchical 
linear model. It assumes that the dataset being analyzed 
consists of a hierarchy of different populations whose 
differences relate to that hierarchy. In econometrics and 
statistics, a fixed effects model is a statistical model that 
represents the observed quantities in terms of explanatory 
variables that are all treated as if those quantities were 
non-random. 
Formally the model is 
yit = β0 + Xitβ + Ziγ + αi + uit, 
where yit is the dependent variable observed for individual 
i at time t, Xit is the time-variant regressor, Zi is the time-
invariant regressor, αi is the unobserved individual effect, 
and uit is the error term. αi could represent motivation, 
ability, genetics (micro data) or historical factors and 
institutional factors (country-level data). 
Fixed effects (FE) model: 
 
 where   
 and    . 
 
Where and 
 
In the above specification yit represents the performance 
measure. Literature provides us various criteria for 
evaluating the bank’s performance. 
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We used Returns on Assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of 
profits before tax to total assets, which measures bank’s 
ability to transform the assets into earnings. We considered 
before-tax profits instead of after-tax profits, because we 
include non-performing loans as a control variable in our 
regression; profits after tax would incorporate the non-
performing loans variable. T – Test has been used to test 
performance of both the set of banks – Public and Private. 
H0:  There is no significant difference in the performance 
of Public sector banks and Private sector banks India. 
H1: There is a significant difference in the performance of 
Public sector banks and Private sector banks in India.  
Assets 
Assets are proxies for bank size measured by the log of 
total assets. As far as the financial scale economies are 
concerned, larger banks would be able to deal with any 
unforeseen shocks and have better risk diversification 
options and thus reduce cost of funding than smaller ones. 
Big banks would also benefit from invisible assurance of 
safety that decreases their cost of funding and allows them 
to invest in riskier portfolios. On the other hand, bank size 
will also cause increasing costs, as larger size is associated 
with diseconomies of scale in production process. Here 
again, the expected sign for the coefficient of this variable 
is unpredictable. 
Capital 
Capital is the ratio of equity capital to total assets. Higher 
capitalization may reflect the strength and soundness of 
banks and higher management quality. It is also a sign that 
well capitalized banks face lower expected bankruptcy 
costs that lowers the needs to go for external funding, 
which in turn reduces their cost of funding and increases 
their profits. Thus, coefficient of capital to assets ratio is 
expected to be positive. 
Loans 
Loans are the ratios of loans to total assets. 
Conventionally, banks collect deposits and transfer them 
into loans. It might be more profitable than other types of 
assets like securities. Other things being equal, the more 
the deposits are transformed into loans, the higher the 
interest margin and profits. However, loans might also be 
more costly to produce as its performance is associated 
with standard of loan collateral that might result in higher 
delinquencies and non-performing loans, which result in 
decreasing interest margins. The net impact of loans is, 
therefore, uncertain. 
Deposits 
Deposits are the ratios of demand deposits to total deposits 
which capture the bank’s relative cost of funds. Demand 
deposits are relatively inexpensive source of funds because 
demand deposits, particularly in developing countries, 
frequently pay less than market interest rates and carry 
lower interest costs, thus increasing bank profitability. On 
the other hand, demand deposits are costly in terms of the 
required branching network which leads to increasing 
costs. Here again, the net impact of deposits is uncertain. 
Loan Loss 
Loan Loss is the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans. It is an indicator of asset quality and proxy for risk 
that indicates how much of the total portfolio has been 
provided for but not charged off. The higher the ratio, the 
poorer the quality, and as a result the higher is the loan 
portfolio risk. According to risk-return hypothesis, high 
risk loans should yield higher returns. On the other hand, 
poorer asset quality may have a negative impact on bank 
profitability by reducing interest margins and increasing 
monitoring costs. Moreover, higher loan quality requires 
more resources on credit underwriting and loan 
monitoring, which in turn lead to higher expenses. 
Therefore, the net impact of Loan Loss is uncertain.  
Our panel data set consists of 41 banks in India for the 
period 2000-2009. Due to non-availability of data for all 
the years for all the banks, we finally made an unbalanced 
panel. All the necessary statistical information was 
obtained from various reports and publications of Reserve 
Bank of India and CAPITALINE database. 
Results  
The mean value (From Appendix I) of ROA says that 
Indian commercial banks have improved their profitability 
over the period of time. We can also say that on the basis 
of analysis that the private banks are more profitable than 
public sector banks on the basis of our analysis. It has also 
been observed that the NPA’s to total assets has been 
reduced over a period of time and this is a positive sign for 
the Indian commercial banks. Public sector banks are more 
efficient in controlling their NPA’s as compared to private 
sector banks. It has also been observed that the total equity 
capital to total assets has been reducing over the period of 
time, which means that the banks are also using other 
sources of capital in their capital structure. But the private 
banks are using more equity in their capital structure as 
compared to public sector banks in their capital structure. 
The results of t-tests for equality of variable means of two 
panels of Public sector and Private sector banks are in 
Table 1. 
The table1 is checked at 5% level of significance. It is 
clear from the above table that in the comparison between 
the panel of both public and private sector banks both have 
same performance in Return of Asset (ROA), Demand 
deposits to total deposit (DD), Equity capital to total assets 
(EQC), in other words there is a no significant difference 
in the performance of Public sector and private sector 
banks on the basis of above said variables. Whereas the 
performance of both Public sector and private sector banks 
differ on the basis of Advance deposit to total deposit 
(ADTA), Non performing asset to total asset (NPATA) & 
Natural log of asset (LOGA). 
From Table 2 it is clear that the variable that are 
considered in the performance of the banks are Log of 
asset, demand deposit to total deposit, Advances to total 
deposit and Non performing asset to total deposit. The 
ideal value of Adjusted R square should be greater than .7 
and the value of adjusted R square here is .794 which 
above the ideal value of .7. It shows that model reveals 
79.4% of variance in the criterion variables. 
From Table3 F ratio (in the Analysis of Variance Table) is 
31.916 and sig at P=0.000 this shows that there exist the 
linear relationship between the variables taken into 
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consideration. We may wish to know whether there is a 
relationship between the response variable and other 
variable that can be tested with the help of t-ratio 
computed in the next table. These two values viz. F ratio 
and t-ratio tell us respectively whether there is a linear 
relationship between the response and explanatory 
variables taken together, and whether any given 
explanatory variable has an influence on the response 
variable over and above that of the other explanatory 
variables. 
Table 1 Independent Samples Test 
  Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
ROA Equal variances 
assumed 
9.117 .004 -2.257 39 .030 -.58439 .25891 -1.10808 -.06069 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
-1.888 17.382 .076 -.58439 .30953 -1.23634 .06757 
DD Equal variances 
assumed 
28.664 .000 -2.947 39 .005 -8.42068 2.85755 -14.20061 -2.64075 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
-2.368 15.490 .031 -8.42068 3.55551 -15.97825 -.86312 
EQC Equal variances 
assumed 
5.974 .019 -1.562 39 .126 -4.01211 2.56897 -9.20835 1.18412 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
-1.248 15.263 .231 -4.01211 3.21379 -10.85189 2.82767 
ADTA Equal variances 
assumed 
2.263 .141 1.670 39 .103 8.21996 4.92287 -1.73749 18.17740 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
1.598 27.517 .122 8.21996 5.14460 -2.32663 18.76654 
NPATA Equal variances 
assumed 
1.098 .301 -.267 39 .791 -.32209 1.20476 -2.75895 2.11477 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
-.232 19.453 .819 -.32209 1.38965 -3.22609 2.58190 
LOGA Equal variances 
assumed 
.338 .564 3.414 39 .002 .58915 .17256 .24011 .93820 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
3.205 25.654 .004 .58915 .18385 .21100 .96731 
  
Table 2. Model Summary
b 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .906a .820 .794 .38497 .820 31.916 5 35 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LOGA, DD, ADTA, NPATA, EQC      
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Table 2. Model Summary
b 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .906a .820 .794 .38497 .820 31.916 5 35 .000 
b. Dependent Variable: ROA       
Table 3. ANOVA
b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
 Regression 23.650 5 4.730 31.916 .000a 
Residual 5.187 35 .148   
Total 28.837 40    
a. Predictors: (Constant), LOGA, DD, ADTA, NPATA, EQC   
b. Dependent Variable: ROA     
Table 4.  Coefficients
a 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.355 .916  1.479 .148 
DD .065 .007 .751 9.136 .000 
EQC -.015 .018 -.147 -.873 .388 
ADTA .012 .005 .215 2.299 .028 
NPATA -.043 .034 -.190 -1.291 .205 
LOGA -.277 .154 -.198 -1.801 .080 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA     
Table 4 shows the value of the coefficients for the 
variables that are been taken under consideration for study. 
This table shows the relationship between the variables 
taken in to consideration and bank’s performance.  
The regression equation is as follows: 
Performance of bank = .751 Demand Deposit to total 
deposits – .147 Equity capital to total assets + .251 
Advance deposit to total deposit – .190 Nonperforming 
assets to total loans - .198 Natural log of Assets. 
From the above equation we can judge that the 
performance of the bank largely depends on its demand 
deposits and advance deposits. They are the major 
predictor of the bank’s performance.  
The scatter plots shows the plots for the between the ROA 
and independent variables of the regression equation. Plot 
is in the favor of the performance of the banks. 
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Chart 1 
 
 
CONCLUSION: 
Our result reveals that there exist a significant difference in 
the performance of Public sector banks and private sector 
banks basis of Advance deposit to total deposit (ADTA), 
Nonperforming asset to total asset (NPATA) & Natural log 
of asset (LOGA).  More over Private sector banks are more 
profitable than Public sector bank. The study also reveals 
that demand deposit and advances are positive correlated 
with ROA whereas NPA, Log of total assets and equity 
capital are negatively correlated. As far as risk is 
concerned Private sector banks have NPA’s as compared 
to Public sector banks. 
As per RBI the global economic outlook deteriorated 
sharply over the last quarter but Indian banking industry 
has no direct exposure to subprime mortgage assets. Banks 
in India continued to remain safe and healthy. The fall of 
Lehman Brothers and Quick succession by several other 
financial institutions made financial markets around the 
world uncertain and unsettled, and India too. But fiscal 
stimulus and comprised monetary policy helped in counter. 
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